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Sheldon-Duplaix: Franco-British Relations at Sea and Overseas

FRANCO-BRIT ISH RE LATIONS AT SEA AND OVER SEAS
A Tale of Two Navies
Alexandre Sheldon-Duplaix

I

n 2009, financial restrictions forced France to close its naval attaché office in
London, the job being transferred to another sailor, the admiral who serves as
France’s defense attaché in the United Kingdom. Paris’s first naval attaché across
the Channel had been posted unofficially in 1856 and formally four years later.
Back then, the two competing empires in Africa and in the East had many shared
interests, be it to keep the Russians out of the Mediterranean and fight the Crimean War, suppress the slave trade in the Gulf of Guinea, open China to their
trade, or to work together to protect their nationals and their investments overseas. During the American Civil War, Paris and London had closely coordinated
their policies to assess and finally accept the Union blockade against the South.
The two navies also planned for a possible confrontation with the North or its
strategic partner, Russia, in the aftermath of the Polish insurrection in 1863. At
the same time, London was envious of France’s famed naval engineer Dupuy de
Lôme and his Gloire-type armored frigates. Britain
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had embarked on an ambitious program to eventually
naval section of the French Defense Historical Service at
reclaim its leadership in naval technology, while sellVincennes, near Paris. He lectures in naval history at
the French Joint Defense Staff College in Paris and at
ing to France steam engines and sharing expertise in
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naval gunnery. As a junior engineer, Dupuy de Lôme
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Studies (Public Service), he has a master’s in history
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1
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Queen Elizabeth aircraft carriers should eventually allow the Royal Navy to deploy larger platforms than the single forty-four-thousand-ton French carrier
Charles de Gaulle. Like the armored frigates of the 1860s, the British carriers
were ordered with an urgent concern not to be second to the French in terms of
capital ships and tonnage, especially when it comes to choosing a flagship for an
allied force.
TWO OLD COM PET I TORS WITH COM PA RA BLE STRATE GIC
IN TER ESTS
On the strategic level, the situations of the United Kingdom and France are comparable. Their economies are on a par, as are their defense budgets, at £40.4 billion (2.5 percent of gross national product) and €42.52 billion (2.6 percent),
respectively. The strengths of British and French militaries are close, at 240,200
and 250,582 men, respectively, including 39,320 and 42,866 for their sea ser vices. Their geostrategic heritages, commitments, and approaches are very similar. As Captain Jean Nicolas Gauthier, France’s last naval attaché in London,
explains, “Britain and France share the same nostalgia of a lost grandeur and
2
have their own particular views on the world.” Both the United Kingdom and
France have national interests that justify deploying forces outside of NATO.
Their militaries are shaped for force projection on a national basis. Despite London’s 1967 vocal withdrawal from “east of Suez” and its focus on NATO, the
United Kingdom remains present overseas through the Commonwealth. Outside the United Kingdom, Elizabeth II is the queen regnant of fifteen independent sovereign countries: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Jamaica, Barbados, the
Bahamas, Grenada, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Belize, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Antigua
and Barbuda. Likewise, France remains politically influential within many of
the twenty-eight French-speaking countries.
Other European nations have been increasingly active in Africa, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Indian Ocean. But their actions have been prompted by
transatlantic or European Union solidarities, not by those nations’ historical interests and commitments. Germany, aside from supporting actively its industry
abroad, has no distant strategic issues that would justify projecting its forces
outside of an allied operation. The same is true for Spain and Italy, but not for
Britian and France.
As recent operations have shown, France and the United Kingdom keep important bases overseas and are committed by strings of military agreements. Cy prus has proved to be a key position for projecting British forces to the Middle
East and farther out to Afghanistan. Likewise, the French DOM-TOM—the nation’s overseas departments and territories—can play the role of “fixed aircraft
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss1/6
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carriers” and effectively provide French forces with logistic bases across the
globe. British garrisons are maintained on Ascension Island, Cy prus, Diego Garcia, and the Falklands, and in Belize, Brunei, Canada, Germany, Gibraltar, Kenya,
and Qatar. Despite the 1967 withdrawal, Britain remains committed in East Asia
by the Five Power Defense Arrangements signed in 1971, whereby the United
Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore will consult each
other in the event of external aggression against the latter two. The British military can recruit personnel among the Commonwealth nations, and British servicemen serve in other Commonwealth armed forces. France has military
agreements with Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Comoros, Djibouti,
Gabon, the Ivory Coast, Kuwait, Qatar, Senegal, Togo, and the United Arab
Emirates. A traditional player in the Arabian Peninsula, with its military links to
Oman, Brit ain is closely matched there by France, which has a pres ence in
Djibouti—on the Horn of Africa—and in a newly established naval and air base
in the United Arab Emirates. Similarly, Britain retains a defense commitment in
Belize, to deter Guatemala’s ambitions, while France is an active partner in the
West Indies, with naval units based in Martinique that participate alongside the
occasional British frigate in the U.S.-led antidrug effort. France and the United
Kingdom have intervened together in such distant theaters as East Timor. London remains committed to the defense of the Falkland Islands, while Guyane
makes of France a South American neighbor.
A FRAME WORK FOR A CLOSER NAVAL RE LATION
For all those reasons, a closer Franco-British naval cooperation makes sense. The
Royal Navy and the Marine Nationale are the two largest navies in Europe, and
they have had for decades a common goal of working together. If it were not for
the sad memories of Mers-el-Kébir—when a reluctant British admiral was summoned by Winston Churchill to attack the fleet of an ally who had been forced
into an armistice by the stunning defeat of its army—and its aftermath, the two
navies would have remained at peace ever since Napoleonic times. For most of
those years, the two navies have sailed in neighboring waters, solving problems
together. They have also fought five wars as allies, including three together with
the United States.
As Captain Gauthier explains, “The relation to the United States is at the
heart of the Franco-British naval cooperation.” First, the reference to America
enables France to celebrate its last major naval victory, at Chesapeake Bay in
1781, giving a convenient response for Britain’s annual Trafalgar commemoration, where French officers have to outwit their former foes. Second, the relation
to the U.S. Navy is strong in both. As Gauthier puts it, each feels like “an older junior brother of the U.S. Navy.” The Royal Navy can bolster the “special
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2011
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relationship” that exists between these two countries separated by a common
language. Britain has always taken pride in its ability to influence the United
States. In that connection, the British diplomatic representation in Washington
is about ten times more numerous than the French. Nevertheless, gratitude to
Lafayette, de Grasse, and Rochambeau and, more recently, sixty years of close
naval cooperation, especially in naval aviation, have forged deep connections
between the navies of the American and French republics.
If Argentina’s successful French-made Exocet missiles caused popular resentment in the United Kingdom during the 1982 Falklands War, London’s defense
secretary at the time praised Paris for its role: “In so many ways [President
François] Mitterrand and the French were our greatest allies,” wrote Sir John
Nott. France made available to Britain Super Étendard and Mirage aircraft so
that Harrier pilots and Royal Navy ships could train against them. Nott also
praised the cooperation with the French secret ser vice that had produced “a remarkable worldwide operation to prevent further Exocets being bought by Argentina,” most notably from Peru, Buenos Aires’s strategic partner. In contrast,
Nott expressed disappointment at the pressure from the White House and the
U.S. State Department to negotiate: “They could not understand that to us any
3
negotiated settlement would have seemed like defeat.” If Nott acknowledged
the role of Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in supplying vital Sidewinder air-to-air missiles to the British, he seemed disenchanted with the “special relationship”: “For all Margaret Thatcher’s friendship with Ronald Reagan,
he remained a West Coast American looking south to Latin America and west to
the Pacific. Sometimes, I wondered if he even knew or cared where Europe was.”
The British recapture of the Falklands—a very close call—remains the defining
accomplishment that to this day justi fies procur ing aircraft carriers and
amphibious ships. Despite (or thanks to) the Exocet, it also showed the value of
French support.
In the past fifteen years the Franco-British naval relation has been further
strengthened. As a former defense attaché in London, Vice Admiral Yann
Tainguy explains, “It is with the Royal Navy that the French Navy has the most
structured relation to work effectively.” In 1996, in Saint-Malo, the commanders
in chief of both navies signed a letter of intent that set up the framework for this
structured naval relation. The agreement covers a wide range of activities including operations, and twenty formal working groups have been established
under the direction of the British and French chiefs of naval staff. They cover future aircraft carrier development, operational planning, training between surface fleets, submarines, naval aviation, communications, personnel exchanges,
amphibious operations, and antisubmarine, antiair, and antisurface warfare
doctrine. An operations cell at the Commander-in-Chief Fleet headquarters at
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss1/6

4

Sheldon-Duplaix: Franco-British Relations at Sea and Overseas

SHELDON-DUPLAIX

83

Northwood is manned by French officers to facilitate liaison and cooperation
4
with the French Navy.
The intent of the agreement was to establish effective cooperation at the
working level between the two navies, mainly among midlevel officers. The
working groups meet every year, usually in the aftermath of a rugby match between the two navies—a contest won by the French side in 2010. People meet
and follow a road map for their discussions. The navies exchange their operational programs, although they do not yet have coordinated burden sharing.
The dialogue has sometimes stumbled on the specificities of both navies. For
instance, France has tried to push the relations in terms of common training.
France and Germany have developed a joint education system for four to five
young officers who spend five years in the other nation finishing their secondary
studies and graduating from the naval academy. France and Italy also trade specific courses for officers and petty officers. With the United Kingdom, however,
common training and naval education have proved so far nearly impossible, because its system of education is entirely different. British naval officers are recruited after university. Basic naval education lasts only about forty weeks before
students earn access to their first positions as naval officers. The best are later retrained to prepare them for longer careers with the appropriate qualifications.
The French system remains based on the “Grande École” concept; graduates of
the naval academy are expected to serve full careers, with the consequence that
French junior officers are usually overqualified for their first assignments. The
British system is more open—the first diploma does not matter so much. Forty
weeks of training provide the basic seamanship required.
When France held the presidency of the European Union (EU), it tried to establish a military-education exchange similar to the Erasmus study-abroad system that exists among European universities. It worked well with Germany, Italy,
and Spain; it failed with the United Kingdom. The plugs just did not fit; the education systems were too different. Captain Philip Stonor, the British assistant
defense attaché in Paris, concurs:
We have the challenge of similar but different approaches to the same culture. We are
broadly the same people, we have the same motivations but we think in different
ways: the Baccalaureate scheme is very Jacobin, very Cartesian: you are told what to
do; most fit in; but some don’t—that is not British who tend to like diversity. The
French system tends to be elitist. But what’s the point of having an elite: does it make
things work better? The British system is based on a looser more interactive base with
a pragmatic approach. If you want to join the Navy, they tell you, go to sea, not sit in
a classroom—that way you will learn what you need to do not how you should do it
5
if you ever get out of the classroom.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2011

5

84

Naval War College Review, Vol. 64 [2011], No. 1, Art. 6

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

The combat training and qualification system of the Royal Navy is very demanding, and Britain would not wish to parallel the French, Spanish, or Italian
equivalents to certify Her Majesty’s ships. On the other hand, France takes advantage of the British system. The Marine Nationale participates in the second
level of the JOINT WARRIOR exercises, which take place in Scotland. French submarines attend Perisher, the submariners’ command course, and the two silent
services exchange officers.
Although all expectations have not been fulfilled, the Saint-Malo mechanism
has proved so satisfactory that the two nations’ armies and air forces followed
this path, signing similar agreements in 1997–98.6 Moreover, in effect the 1996
naval agreement has been recapitulated at the political level. The two ministers
of defense have always asked to be briefed on this cooperation, which remains
political in essence.
In this context, the past decade has put the Franco-British relationship to a
test. President Jacques Chirac’s opposition to the American-British intervention
in Iraq provoked a split and a misunderstanding not only in transatlantic relations but also in cross-Channel diplomacy. IRAQI FREEDOM caused a deep rift
between the allies. Military relations between the United States and France were
nearly suspended, and general officers of each ceased to travel to the other country. The situation did not get to that point between the French and British militaries, but the flow of information was considerably reduced. As a consequence,
cooperation became more difficult and France was barred from learning the
very important operational lessons of the military operations under way in Iraq.
Ever since, both militaries have known distinct paths of evolution. The
French Navy has remained more visible than the Royal Navy, whose seagoing
role has been shadowed by ground operations and bad luck. While training the
born-again Iraqi navy on the Shatt al Arab and protecting a vital Iraqi offshore
platform, a Royal Navy detachment was captured by Iranian Pasdarans during
the Easter vacation. This was simply a matter of poor timing, but the incident
served poorly the image of the service at a time of budgetary discussion. The
usual detractors questioned the usefulness of Royal Navy missions such as those
that had led to this embarrassment.
On the other hand, the Royal Marines built up their experience and influence
by taking a major role in the Iraq war. They outnumber by far the French naval
commandos and Fusiliers Marins, and they constitute a definite specialization
of the Royal Navy ground capability that does not exist in France, where the
Troupes de Marine belong to the Army.
Despite the 2003 split over Iraq, Paris and London worked very hard for the
creation in 2004 of a European Defence Agency (EDA). At the political level the
main difference be tween the two countries lay with the French position
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss1/6
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regarding Europe. France supports the view that Europe should develop capabilities to conduct global military operations of its own. Britain and the Royal Navy
have always had an inclination toward the American “special relationship.” The
United Kingdom has always considered any duplication of existing NATO capabilities as a waste of resources. Paris views Europe’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as having a better chance to address global issues than
NATO, with its American dimension. London feels uneasy about combining the
CSDP with NATO, while the United States has put forward the three Ds: no duplication, no decoupling from the United States or NATO, and no discrimination against non-EU members, such as Turkey.
The purpose of EDA is “to support the Member States and the Council in
their effort to improve European defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the European Security and Defence Policy as it stands
now and develops in the future.”7 Unlike NATO, EDA has a bottom-up approach. The idea is an organization with concentric circles and different levels of
entry that would reflect the levels of interest of new members and investments
that they would be ready to make. Depending on interest and their financial possibilities, members would proceed toward the inner circle of countries fully
committed to developing a certain type of equipment. In this respect, Britain
and France seem to be the two most committed of the larger members of EDA.
The purpose of EDA is to help develop a military industrial base and a military capability that can be used to serve the European Union’s strategy and the
CSDP, which was created in the aftermath of the Chirac-Blair meeting in
Saint-Malo in 1998.
From a British perspective, the core of this effort has been supported by
France and the United Kingdom. Germany is also a very important member, but
the question has always been whether Germany would go all the way to deploying troops. As a result of Operation ARTEMIS in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, European nations have contemplated a permanent force that would be
ready for deployment at any time, like EURFOR, EUROMARFOR, or the
Franco-German Brigade.8 So far, the problem has remained at the national level.
Some nations are ready to commit troops and ships but will not pay the costs.
Other nations cannot be trusted, because they may back down for political reasons.9 From a French perspective, however, Paris has always tried to promote the
creation of a European Union structure for planning and joint operations, while
Britain has resisted duplicating an existing NATO capability.
THE QUEST FOR THE HOLY GRAIL OF INDUSTRIAL SYNERGIES
In an ideal world British and French naval industries should be merged, because
the two navies’ needs are identical: aircraft carriers, strategic submarines,
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2011
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nuclear attack submarines, antiaircraft destroyers, general-purpose frigates,
amphibious assault ships, and seagoing replenishment ships. Both British and
French standards for acoustic silencing are much stricter than those of other European nations. In that sense, an ideal consolidation of European naval shipbuilding might include Britain joining France, on the one hand, with Germany
merging its capabilities with Italy’s, on the other hand. Still, this will most likely
never happen.
One French participant refuses to view the termination in 1999 of the Horizon air-defense destroyer program as a failure: “Put the Type 45 Daring [(D32),
the first Type 45 unit] and the Forbin [(D620), French lead ship of the Horizon
class] side by side: they just look alike and share the same weapon system. We
worked very hard to have a common weapon system and unfortunately we were
not able to agree on the combat system. But this is certainly not a failure: we created a wealth of contacts and relations that have been extremely useful for the industry and that could be reactivated at will.” Through the Horizon program
France learned to write detailed specifications and contracts. In the past, past
navy-military procurement procedures were very simple, with the navy putting
its requirements very briefly—two hundred pages for the La Fayette frigates.
With the Horizon written specifications, of six thousand pages, the French Navy
transformed its relations with the industry. Aside from this learning experience,
cooperation on warship programs is always difficult, because of legitimate national concerns about safeguarding expertise, jobs, and shipyards. But some in
France think that both countries could have gone farther. Cooperation on
Horizon was rocked by a series of difficulties.
For one, the industrial partners did not have the same status: the then Directorate for Naval Construction (now DCNS) was part of the French state, whereas
GEC, its British counterpart, was not a shipyard and belonged to the BAE aerospace group. Some on the French side felt that GEC was unfamiliar with the naval domain. Moreover, the British naval industry was in trouble, having been
unable to restructure and cut down the number of its shipyards. More numerous and smaller yards meant duplication and a smaller critical mass that did not
fit the ambitious research and development (R&D) effort required for the
Horizon program.
The national calendars diverged. With Masurca air-defense missiles reaching the end of their lives and the SM-1 Tar tar being less capable of defeating
cruise missiles, France initially wanted its Hori zon antiair destroyers by 2004
and had to order them in 1998. The British had already decided to stretch the
lives of the Type 42s and had planned to order their Hori zon destroyers only in
2000.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss1/6
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The partners were overoptimistic as to the numbers they could afford. Britain
wanted twelve units, Italy pretended to buy six, and France had planned on four
(to replace altogether the two Suffren and the two Cassard frigates), for a grand
total of twenty-two. Only ten—four Horizon and six Type 45—will come out in
the end.
Rolls-Royce’s TR21 gas turbine was selected, but it would not be ready in time
for the French program.
France and Italy wanted the European Multifunction Phased Array Radar
(EMPAR), while the British side supported its own Sampson (an “active electronically scanned array” radar being developed by BAE Systems). Actually Britain was ready to spend more on its R&D, because expertise had been lost due to
financial restrictions under Margaret Thatcher. London was hoping to install
the Sampson on all twenty-two ships.
At first, Brit ain was un cer tain about the missile itself. Going with Aster
would close the door for the SM-3 and Tomahawk, two impor tant weap ons
for their antitactical-ballistic-missile and land-attack capabilities. The SM-3
and Tomahawk re quired a broader hull. Although the Brit ish did choose
Aster, with its sixty-four-cell Silver ver ti cal launch sys tem (VLS), de signed
by DCN, the Type 45 is broader than the Franco-Italian Hori zon and could
eventually accommodate, with modifications, the Mark 41 VLS with SM-3
and Tomahawk.
The combat-management system (CMS) seemed, however, to have been the
main obstacle. Both France and the United Kingdom wanted to take the lead for
the CMS. Initial trouble with the Type 23 CMS had led Britain to show an interest in the French CMS, owned by DCN. Being a public company, DCN could not
head the overall program consortium but wanted to lead the CMS. GEC claimed
the leadership, while the French partner felt that it was more experienced in this
particular area. Transferring DCN’s know-how on CMS to GEC, a potential
competitor, would not be profitable for France.
In the end, Horizon and its half brother the Type 45 reflect different philosophies and cultures. France accepts a ship into its navy when its weapons and systems have been integrated, tried, and certified. Having an aviation culture, BAE
favored an incremental process, as for aircraft prototypes. The first Type 45 was
commissioned with its main radar untested and without an electronic warfare
suite. Sampson was first tried on the testing barge Longbow in 2009, when Daring
was already in commission. Instead of a CMS, it carries a command-and-control
system capable of handling the Principal Anti-Air Missile System. Earlier, the
Type 23 frigates also lacked combat-management systems at the beginnings of
their lives.
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Despite its termination, the Horizon program created a momentum that the
two countries tried to use for their aircraft carrier programs. Politically, thenpresident Jacques Chirac wanted cooperation with Britain. The choice of conventional gas tur bines instead of nuclear propulsion (as in Charles de Gaulle)
made by an interministerial committee proved the French desire to pave the way
toward a common design. The French carrier would still have had to produce additional steam for its catapults (which the Queen Elizabeths were not supposed to
have at first), but the committee had concluded that it was best to have a larger carrier than Charles de Gaulle, because future planes would be larger. This also explains why the Franco-British design displaces sixty thousand tons and why
Charles de Gaulle’s propulsion plant would not be powerful enough for a nuclear
variant of what would have been France’s much-larger number-two carrier.
The aircraft carrier cultures of the two nations proved surprisingly distinct.
In France the aircraft carrier is a warship in itself. The captain is in charge of
both the platform and the air group and directs all operations. In the United
Kingdom two separate worlds coexist, the platform and the air group. Each
world has its own operational life, and there are two hierarchies, one for the ship
and one for the air group. This explains why the British carrier design has two islands, with combat information centers in both islands.
The British notion that air operations can be distinct from the ship’s operations is seen as heresy on the other side of the Channel. Captain Stonor acknowledges this difference: “We have yet to find the happy balance between the RAF
[Royal Air Force] way of operating and Naval procedures. There are two big differences: RAF are very reluctant to do non-diversionary flights when embarked;
and the RAF has yet [to] be convinced of the advantages of ‘hot refueling.’ No
doubt for their own good reasons they don’t want to do things the Naval way.”10
Notwithstanding this philosophical difference, the British architecture has its
advantages. Antennas have to be set apart anyway to avoid problems of electromagnetic incompatibility. The two-islands concept is also better for survivability in case of a hit.
The French side argued that building the three hulls (i.e., two British, one
French) in Saint-Nazaire would halve the overall costs, but Britain could not let
down its own shipyards. In the end both sides made concessions, and the final
design showed a commonality of about 80 percent. This meant significant saving, but once again the political tempos did not match. In 2006, one year before
the French presidential elections, London was not ready to order. When Britain
gave its go-ahead, the French elections were a couple of months away and Paris
could not follow suit. The newly elected Nicolas Sarkozy postponed his decision
to 2011–12, a move that was confirmed in June 2010. Everything is still possible,
but the synergy is lost, at least partially.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss1/6
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NEW OP PORTU NI TIES OUT OF DIF FI CULT TIMES
Although the “special relationship” was put to the test back in 2003 in Iraq,
where the American ally did not listen to British concerns over the lack of postwar planning, it remains profitable for Britain. As a British source comments,
“The best way for the United States to deal with Europe is to use Britain as a tool
to apply pressure in return for the British doing their bidding with the Europeans. The British view is: it is a hassle to go through the US Congress etc. . . . but in
the end, the net gain is superior: we are better off. And this is currently making
Britain reticent towards working closer with Europe.”
Like the French Navy, the Royal Navy is going through difficult times. The defense focus and allocations are going to ground and air operations. Unlike their
father, uncles, and granduncles, the royal princes are serving in the British Army
and not in the Royal Navy. The sea ser vice awaits the forthcoming 2010 strategic
defense review with anxiety, hoping that its carrier-based navy concept will be
reaffirmed. The army and the RAF are against the carriers, which compete for
funding with their ground operations. But as Captain Stonor explains, “The Icelandic volcano [i.e., the eruptions that intermittently disrupted European air
traffic beginning in April 2010] has shown that geographically fixed air bases
have, as we always knew, serious limitations. The value of the carrier remains intact; moreover, in Afghanistan, the Allies still use the carriers to support ground
operations and we are waiting for the Charles de Gaulle at the end of this year.”
Captain Gauthier believes that those difficulties create a window of opportunity for British-French naval cooperation:
British pragmatism should acknowledge that the defense posture of both nations is
closely interdependent: we share the same fate. The fact that our two navies operate
the whole spectrum of platforms from aircraft carriers to strategic submarines and
amphibious assault ships means that if one nation loses one of those components, the
other nation will lose a justification to retain it: its public opinion will not understand why this component is still valid if its neighbor has done away with it. Therefore, both nations have to support each other. Everything is possible and everything
can be lost.11

The British defense review has announced further cuts that should give an incentive to explore mutually advantageous cooperation. Even the Tories now acknowledge that Britain cannot produce all it needs for its defense. Captain
Stonor believes that there is “a lot to be gained to try to move towards a BritishFrench research and development effort that Europe has yet to produce.” In his
view it would be well to go along with the lines envisaged by Prime Minister
David Cameron and President Sarkozy.
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The carrier issue is of paramount importance to both navies. Clearly the future of the Royal Navy is at stake. For both Britain and France it is also a matter
of credibility in their partnership with the United States. The construction of
Queen Elizabeth II, Britain’s first of the new carrier class, is moving fast. But the
prospects for the F-35B short-takeoff-vertical-landing (STOVL) aircraft under
development are gloomier every day, with spiraling costs and a small number of
participants.
If the F-35B STOVL collapses, the F-35C CTOL (conventional takeoff and
landing) or the F-18 would be likely choices for Britain. France might harbor
some hopes for the Rafale, especially if Brazil takes it for its own carrier. Through
EADS, France is also a partner in the Eurofighter. Making a naval version of the
latter might prove too expensive. In any case, the return to a CTOL carrier implies for the Royal Navy a necessity to relearn skills that the United Kingdom
orig inally introduced in carrier aviation. Captain Stonor considers that Prince of
Wales, the second carrier, could if required still be fitted with a catapult, most
likely electromagnetic.
This decision will bring the two nations back to a similar carrier design,
opening the door for further cooperation. Suggestions have been made that the
two nations could share one of the two British carriers. But they don’t seem
practical. The United Kingdom will need to train its pilots, and France might be
a closer and cheaper option than sending them to the United States. Charles de
Gaulle has demonstrated its ability to cooperate closely with U.S. aircraft carriers. During recent exchanges, French Rafales have had their engines removed
and replaced by French aircraft maintenance teams deployed on American aircraft carriers. There is perhaps a future for trilateral American-British-French
cooperation on carriers. Britain might want the French to train their flight-deck
personnel, and the United States might view that favorably.
Britain has improved six of its thir teen Type 23 antisubmarine frigates,
thanks to the Thales Group’s French-made Type 2087 towed passive array. Collaboration with France on Britain’s Future Surface Combatant seems unlikely,
though. On paper, the Type 26’s specifications are closely similar to those of
the DCNS’s FREMM multimission frig ate. But for industrial reasons, Britain
has decided to go its own way and turn down a proposal to join the FrancoItalian design. Britain will not buy Aster 15 either. Instead, a new short-range
air-defense missile will be developed with MBDA, the multinational missilesystems group. The logic is commercial. The United Kingdom is willing to offer the Type 26 for export. If the British had put Aster 15 on Type 26, they
would have had the inconvenience of seeking French and Italian approval before exporting the ship. The Type 26s will also carry Tomahawk land-attack
cruise missiles, a logical step given that the Royal Navy would not want to have
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss1/6
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two different types of cruise missiles in its inventory if it were to buy France’s
SCALP naval air-launched cruise missile.
France’s full reintegration within NATO should favor the development of European interoperable systems. It may find a common ground with Britain
through EDA. In the replacement of their replenishment ships, so far Britain
and France are going their own ways. In mine-countermeasures vessels, there is a
potential area of cooperation, both nations having considerable experience. For
drones, France and Britain could cooperate, but BAE has clearly chosen the
United States as its partner.
On the operational side, cooperation has always been easier. As Captain
Gauthier explains, “We don’t always have interoperable systems but we do integrate our forces. At sea you have less borders and more character.” NATO has always been the base for Franco-British naval cooperation. As a matter of fact, the
return of France to the NATO military organization has been transparent for the
Marine Nationale, which works on a daily basis with NATO procedures.
For both Britain and France, the operational priority is to retain their skills.
The danger is the focus on certain missions that distract both navies from practicing and retaining some of their important skills, such as antisubmarine warfare. So far, exchanges for naval training have not worked properly. Sources in
the French naval industry see a commercial obstacle. Unlike in France, the
United Kingdom’s naval education is being run by a private company named
Flagship, which belongs to BAE, a competitor of DCNS. From that perspective,
the lack of training exchanges may explain the difficulties encountered in developing joint programs. Captain Stonor maintains, however, that the main challenge is cultural and not commercial.
Despite those limitations on training exchanges, each country has had, for the
past years, seven or eight exchange officers in the other navy. As Captain
Gauthier explains, “This is a high mark of mutual confidence to entrust the
watch of a major warship to a foreign officer: it creates a network of people who
know each other and keep in touch to facilitate mutual understanding while
they grow up.” The French and British navies are also each providing a frigate to
escort the other nation’s aircraft carrier during deployments.
Another opportunity came out of an embarrassment. The British and French
nuclear ballistic-missiles submarines Vanguard and Triomphant collided in the
Atlantic on 3 February 2009. (Both were submerged and, according to Britain’s
Ministry of Defence, moving “at very low speed.”) The accident made it clear
that the two countries did not coordinate their underwater strategic patrols, a
fact that Commodore Stephen Saunders, the editor of Jane’s Fighting Ships, criti12
cized harshly, given the possible consequences. Inter viewed by journalists, the
French defense minister suggested that both countries could “think about their
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2011
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patrol zones.” Recent talks are said to have included the idea of “sharing deter14
rence,” although this may prove politically too sensitive.
On the (metaphorical) ground, British and French forces—including the navies
—are again fighting side by side. French naval commandos were active in Afghanistan until 2007, when President Chirac decided on their withdrawal.
French naval aviation has been involved on the Afghan theater, with attack aircraft
—Super Étendards and Rafales—and airborne-early-warning Hawkeyes operating from Charles de Gaulle or from land during the carrier’s yard period. The
Ministry of Defence in the United Kingdom is experiencing the stress of
long-term ground operations that have been moved from the Iraqi to the Afghan
battlegrounds, with ten thousand troops engaged in a tough province. France
has smaller forces in Afghanistan, with 3,500. France’s contingent has now gone
from the Kabul area to a riskier zone, where it is taking casualties. Sadly, sharing
losses also strengthens bonds.
France plays an active role in the antipiracy mission off Somalia. For the
Royal Navy, given the limited number of its platforms, the piracy mission was
not a priority, but its command-and-control contribution is praised. Under
Rear Admiral Philip Jones, the command center at Northwood has been credited
with doing a remarkable job in directing ATALANTA, the EU operation against
piracy off the Horn of Africa.
The United Kingdom and France are separated by the Channel wherein they
work together. Unlike France, Britain has a dedicated coast guard ser vice—the
Maritime and Coastguard Agency—and the Royal Navy does not share with the
Marine Nationale the mission of safeguarding the maritime domain. But the
countries char ter together, and share the operating costs of, the tug Sea Monarch
and are planning together for the security of the London 2012 Olympics.
{LINE-SPACE}
The past decade has been tough for Franco-British naval relations, with a political split over Iraq and with differing industrial and political agendas that led to
the termination of the cooperation on the Horizon program and a failure to
build three aircraft carriers together.
France and the United Kingdom have common interests and objectives, but
their realization is complicated by decision-making processes that often do not
match the political tempos on either side of the Channel. Unifying the European
naval landscape has proved impossible so far, despite a promising approach
through the European Defence Agency. Thales and MBDA have been able to
merge the aerospace sector, but the naval sector remains very much a national
symbol— there are no lasting and reliable alliances when it comes to cutting the
metal to keep yards working.
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On the operational side, cooperation has always been strong. As France’s last
naval attaché to London summarizes it, “Both navies work well together. We
have built up a trusting relationship. We both know that we would support each
other in case of necessity.” In French eyes, the Royal Navy remains very powerful
and very capable. Its training is rigorous, and the French Navy is eager to learn
from it. For Britain’s part, as the assistant defense attaché in Paris notes, “within
Europe, the FR-UK naval relation is moving faster.”
At the time of this writing the British government was considering cutting
down the size of its fleet in order to save at least one new carrier, with the second
being either converted into a helicopter carrier, mothballed upon completion,
or discarded. The Trident replacement plans should remain intact. Those prospects should encourage the Royal Navy to increase its interoperability with the
French Navy. Fitting a catapult to one of the carriers could be part of that effort.
The carrier may receive the less expensive CTOL version of the F-35 and perhaps
have the capability to host the French Rafale and American F-18. Senior British
officers have already underlined that further reduction of the order of battle
would force the Royal Navy to abandon certain missions, such as the Armilla patrols in the Persian Gulf and the Caribbean deployments.
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